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TAXATION 
I. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION OF TAX PROTESTORS: 
DID THE NINTH CIRCUIT GO TOO FAR? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Wilson, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that se-
lective prosecutionS claims are immediately appealable, and, 
that absent a showing that others who were similarly situated 
but who had not exercised their constitutional rights were not 
prosecuted, a defendant is not entitled to dismissal of the indict-
ment on grounds of selective prosecution. a 
The Wilsons were indicted for deliberately falsifying federal 
income tax withholding statements.4 Defendants moved to 
quash the indictment on the grounds of selective prosecution, 
alleging that they were singled out because they protested 
against the tax laws. II Defendants attached a lengthy memoran-
dum to their tax returns setting forth their belief in the uncon-
stitutionality of the tax law and refused to answer any questions 
on fifth amendment grounds.' 
1. 639 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were 
Kilkenny, J., and Real, D.J., sitting by designation, concurring). 
2. Selective prosecution exists when a defendant is prosecuted under an unjustifi-
able standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary c\aasification. Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S. 448, 456 (1962). This standard was initially expanded to prohibit prosecution based 
on the exercise of first amendment rights. United States v. Choate, 619 F.2d 21, 23 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th 
Cir. 1972). Later, the standard was expanded to include the exercise of constitutional 
rights. United States v. Wilaon, 639 F.2d at 504; United States v. Berrios, SOl F.2d 1207, 
1211 (2d Cir. 1974). 
3. United States v. Wilaon, 639 F.2d at 504. 
4. Id. at 501. The Wilaona were indicted under 26 U.S.C. § 7205 (1976) which pro-
vides, in part, that "[aJny individual required to supply information to his employer ... 
who wil1fully supplies falae or fraudulent information ... shall ... upon conviction 
thereof. be fined not more than $500, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both." 
5. 639 F.2d at 501. 
6. Id. at S03. The fifth amendment provides in relevant part that no one "shall be 
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At the pre-trial hearing, defendants alleged not only that 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) prosecuted all tax protes-
tors, but also that it had not recently prosecuted any non-
protestors.' The IRS investigator stated he knew that defen-
dants were invoking their constitutional rights in response to the 
investigator's questions.' Despite this showing, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the defendants failed to meet the burden of a selective 
prosecution claim. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Timeliness of Appeal 
The concept of finality stems from the late eighteenth cen-
tury.' The final judgment rule, which exists mainly to protect 
judicial efficiency, at times interferes with an individual's consti-
tutional or statutory rights.10 Because this rule has caused hard-
ship to some individuals, the Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Industrial Loan Corp.,l1 announced a collateral order 
exception to the final judgment rule. Under this rule, an inter-
locutory order had to meet three criteria to be collateral and 
thus immediately appealable: (1) the order must fully dispose 
the question presented; (2) the decision must not be a step 
7. 639 F.2d at 504. The defendants presented evidence that 5,140 people in Arizona 
filed exempt or excessive W·4 statements, that the IRS scrutinized 1,689 W-4 forms and 
that 425 individuals also failed to file a 1040 form. The IRS investigated and prosecuted 
only two cases. The Wilsons were taI protestors but the status of the other prosecuted 
party was unknown. An exempt or excessive W·4 form exists when an employee claims 
more tax deductions than are legally allowed. The Government usually identifies § 7205 
offenses in conjunction with failing to file a 1040 form. United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 
937, 939 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976). 
8. Although this is not part of the selective prosecution teat, it demonstrates that 
the IRS knew that the Wilsons were protestors before it decided to prosecute. The Wil· 
sons had to allege purposeful discrimination to win a motion to dismiss. See United 
States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1972). 
9. See McClay v. Hanna, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 160 (1799) (appeal must await a definite 
decree). The current codification of this concept is at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) which 
provides in part: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where direct review may 
be had in the Supreme Court." 
10. See, e.g., Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328·29 (1940) (due regard 
for efficiency in litigation must not be carried 80 far as to deny all opportunity for the 
appeal contemplated by the statutes). See also Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in 
Criminal Cases: An Open But Closely Guarded Door, 66 GBO. L.J. 1163, 1164 (1978) 
(under sufficiently compelling circumstances a defendant's interest in an immediate ap-
peal may outweigh the interests advanced by the finality rule). 
11. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
2
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toward final disposition of the merits of the case that would 
merge in the final judgment; and (3) the ruling must involve an 
important right that would be lost if review had to await final 
judgment.12 The Court distinguished a final decision from a final 
judgment13 and noted that an appeal will be allowed from a final 
decision only when justified by special circumstances. If 
The problem that appellate courts faced was defining spe-
cial circumstances and deciding whether defendant's interest in 
immediate review was compelling enough to overcome the heavy 
judicial bias against interlocutory appeals, especially in criminal 
cases. 111 In Stack v. Boyle,18 the Supreme Court applied the Co-
hen exception to a criminal case and held an order denying a 
motion to reduce bail immediately appealable.17 The Court ex-
pressed concern that the presumption of innocence would be-
come meaningless if the defendant were allowed to languish in 
jail awaiting trial. 18 
In United States v. Higgins, II the Ninth Circuit held that a 
pre-trial commitment order was immediately appealable under 
Cohen.10 The court gave two reasons. First, the defendant's trial 
may be delayed indefinitely, if not forever, so that the commit-
ment order had a phase of finality in it.1I Second, the order 
would never be reviewed on direct appeal after trial. II The 
threat of a defendant languishing in jail or in a mental hospital 
12. [d. at 545-47. . 
13. [d. See also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. I, 12 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (al-
though a final judgment is always a final decision, a final decision need not be a final 
judgment). 
14. 337 U.S. at 546. See also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977) (spe-
cial circumstances in double jeopardy claims justifies the application of the collateral 
order doctrine). 
15. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977). See, e.g., United States v. 
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853 (1978) (rule of finality has particular force in criminal 
prosecutions); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (considerations of 
policy against piecemeal review are especially compelling in the administration of crimi-
nal justice). 
16. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
17. [d. at 6. 
18. [d. at 4. 
19. 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 870 (1953). 
20. [d. at 652. 
21. [d. The Higgins court did not hold a pre.trial commitment order immediately 
appealable because it could not be appealed after the trial, but because an appeal after 
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without a right to appeal was the Ninth Circuit's major con-
cern. IS Higgins tentatively identified one group of cases that 
would always be immediately appealable: those where a defen-
dant is threatened with loss of liberty.24 
The Supreme Court expanded the Stack rationale to in-
clude loss of a constitutional right in Abney v. United States,21 
in which it held an order denying a double jeopardy motion im-
mediately appealable.lltl The Abney Court reasoned that the fifth 
amendment provision against double jeopardy extended to 
double trials as well as double punishments, and that if an ap-
peal was not allowed before the allegedly unconstitutional sec-
ond trial, the defendant would have irreparably lost a constitu-
tional right without any opportunity for appellate review/" The 
application of the collateral order rule in its entirety, however, 
has spawned additional ambiguity in questions about immediate 
appealability.18 
In United States v. MacDonald,I" the Supreme Court lim-
ited the potential expansiveness of Abney by holding that a mo-
tion to dismiss an indictment was not immediately appealable 
when based on a violation of defendant's sixth amendmentaO 
23. ld. 
24. By its nature, a loss of liberty constitutes irreparable harm. For the standard to 
use to determine irreparable harm, see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
641 (1949). This loss also cannot be vindicated on appeal because confinement is both 
immediate and irreversible. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 12; United States v. Higgins, 
205 F.2d at 653. 
25. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
26. ld. at 662. 
27. ld. at 660. 
28. ' The confusion about when the collateral order exception applies is due in part to 
different language used to articulate the same test. The second criterion in the Cohen 
teat states that the pre-trial order must not be merely a step towards resolution on the 
merits. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546. Instead of demonstrating 
how a double jeopardy claim is not a step towards resolution on the merits, the Abney 
Court stated that a double jeopardy claim is collateral to the merits in the sense that it 
has nothing to do with guilt or innocence. 431 U.S. at 659. Almost every pre-trial order is 
collateral to the merits in this sense, yet not all pre-trial orders are appealable. See, e.g., 
DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962) (denial of motion to suppress illegal 
evidence is not immediately appealable). Due to this juxtaposition of language and lack 
of clear guidance, it has been necessary for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a 
number of these cases. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 530 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1976), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); United States v. Mac-
Donald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 850 (1978). 
29. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). 
30. The sixth amendment states: "(TJhe accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
4
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right to a speedy trial. 31 The Court justified its decision on three 
grounds: (1) the speedy trial claim is heavily dependent on the 
facts developed at trial; (2) the defendant's constitutional rights 
did not suffer irreparable harm; and (3) allowing an interlocu-
tory appeal would defeat the policy the speedy trial clause was 
designed to effectuate.32 The MacDonald Court decided that the 
irreparable harm criteria was probably the most important fac-
tor in assessing the right to an immediate appeal.33 
In United States v. Griffin,34 the Ninth Circuit read Abney 
expansively and held that an order denying a motion to dismiss 
an indictment on grounds of vindictive prosecution was immedi-
ately appealable.36 The Griffin court stressed the similarities be-
tween double jeopardy and vindictive prosecution claims and 
concluded that the latter fulfilled the Abney criteria.3s The court 
found that a defendant's rights would be lost irrevocably if ap-
pellate review were postponed until the final judgment, because 
defendant would have to undergo "the personal strain, public 
embarrassment and expense" inherent in preparing a defense.3' 
Unnecessary preparations for a criminal defense, however bur-
densome, is not what the collateral order exception was designed 
to accommodate.38 The Abney Court stressed that the harm was 
not that of being put to trial with its attendant burdens and 
and public trial .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
31. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 853. 
32.ld. 
33. Id. at 856. To qualify for an immediate appeal, the Court stated that, perhaps 
most importantly, defendant's rights must be significantly undermined if appellate reo 
view were postponed until after conviction and sentencing. Id. 
34. 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980). 
35. Id. at 1346. Vindictive prosecution exists when a defendant is reindicted or reo 
tried on more severe charges after the defendant exercises a statutory or constitutional 
right. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27·28 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 725-26 (1969); United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1346-47; United States v. An-
drews, 612 F.2d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 1979); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 142 (7th Cir. 
1978). 
36. 617 F.2d at 1346. 
37. Id. (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 661). The Griffin court quoted 
Abney out of context. Abney described the purpose of the double jeopardy clause; it did 
not create a right not to be tried because of the strain and expense of a criminal trial. 
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 661. 
38. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 663. Special considerations are neces-
sary to justify a departure from the normal rules of finality. Pendent claims must fit 
within the Cohen exception to be immediately appealable. Id. Cobbledick v. United 
States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (Bearing the discomforture and cost of a prosecution for 
a crime even by an innocent person is one of the painful obligations of citizenship.). 
5
Kirk: Taxation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
330 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:325 
difficulties, but rather in being put' to trial twice in violation of 
constitutional protections.8e Furthermore, the Court noted that 
a defendant's right would probably be lost irrevocably if an ap-
peal had to await a final judgment.4o It seems doubtful that the 
Supreme Court would follow Griffin because of the high stan-
dards of irreparable harm that the Court utilizes when analyzing 
a right to an immediate appeal.41 
Selective Prosecution 
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,41 the Supreme Court stated: 
Though the law itself be fair on its face and im-
partial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and ad-
ministered by public authority with an evil eye 
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make 
unjust and illegal discriminations between per-
sons in similar circumstances, material to their 
rights, the denial .of equal justice is still within 
the prohibition of the Constitution." 
In Oyler v. Boles," the Supreme Court extended this consti-
tutional defense to allow challenges to prosecutorial discretion in 
a criminal case. The Court applied the traditional equal protec-
tion analysis and concluded that the mere exercise of some con-
scious selectivity is not by itself a constitutional violation." 
There must be a showing that the selection was based upon an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary 
classification.48 
39. See 431 U.S. at 661 (<I[A defendant) will not be forced, with certain exceptions, 
to endure the personal strain, public embar888ment, and expense of a criminal trial more 
than once for the same offense.") (emphasis added). See also text accompanying note 34 
supra. 
40. 431 U.S. at 662. 
41. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. See also text accompanying note 29 
supra. 
42. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The defendant, a person of Chinese descent, was convicted 
under an ordinance prohibiting operation of a laundromat in a wooden building. Defen-
dant's application for a permit to operate was denied while white persons' permits were 
granted. The Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction stating that racial discrimi-
nation in law enforcement was prohibited by the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 356-62. 
43. Id. at 373·74. 
44. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). 
45. Id. at 456. 
46.1d. 
6
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In United States v. Berrios," the Second Circuit defined ar-
bitrary classification to include prosecutions based upon the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights.48 The Berrios court, however, 
failed to clearly base its decision upon either the chilling effect 
selective prosecutions has on free speech, or the notion that 
prosecution based on defendant's exercise of his constitutional 
rights was arbitrary. If the Berrios court based its decision upon 
selective prosecution's potential chilling effect on free speech, 
the court must distinguish between speech and conduct, because 
free speech is entitled to constitutional protection, while conduct 
is not." If, however, the Berrios court included the exercise of 
constitutional rights because it is an arbitrary basis of selection 
for prosecution, then very different issues were presented. When 
making this claim, a defendant invokes the equal protection 
component of the fifth amendment. &0 To prevail, a defendant 
must show that others similarly situated are not being prose-
cuted for similar conduct and, that the basis for selecting a de-
fendant for prosecution was illegitimate-that is, based on race, 
religion or other arbitrary classification. III 
The claim of selective prosecution is an affirmative defense, 
however, and the defendant bears the burden of proof. III If the 
defendant prevails on this claim, it is uncertain whether he can 
be reindicted on the same charge or whether the defense is 
absolute. lls 
47. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974). 
48. Id. at 1211. 
49. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). "[WJhen 'speech' and 
'non-speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. 
50. United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 86 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
818 (1976). 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 853 (1976); United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 86 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974). 
52. See generally 19 Loy. L. REv. 318 (1973). 
53. Compare United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1973) (finding of 
discriminatory enforcement need only result in a dismissal of the charge, not in an ac-
quittal) with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 64 (1971) (criminal defendants have a right 
to be free from prosecutions brought in bad faith) and Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 
357,359 (1953) (dictum) (a defendant could defeat a criminal prosecution that was based 
on intentional discrimination). See United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 631 (7th Cir. 
1973) (Cummings, J., dissenting). If reindictment is allowed, then the prosecution would 
pass the court's scrutiny merely because the case was stated more discreetly. If reindict· 
7
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Despite these uncertainties, the single most important de-
termination in a selective prosecution analysis is the kind of 
showing required for the defendant to meet his burden. In 
United States v. Steele,1I4 the defendant showed that although 
the Census Bureau knew of at least ten persons who violated the 
law, the director only chose to prosecute those individuals who 
had aired their views publicly.u The Ninth Circuit held this to 
be impermissible discrimination and reversed the conviction." 
The defendant's unique showing explained how he met his bur-
den of proof since there was a perfect delineation between 
protestors and non-protestors.1I'7 The Steele court, however, did 
not state whether this showing necessarily sustained a claim of 
selective prosecution, although later Ninth Circuit cases suggest 
that it does." 
In United States v. Falk, lit defendant claimed he was se-
lected from among 25,000 violators and was prosecuted because 
he actively participated in a draft-counseling movement."O He 
failed to show that the government knew of other violators, or 
that other violators did not protest against the draft-both of 
which were essential to sustain his claim of selective prosecu-
tion."l The Falk court relied heavily on the government's devia-
tion from its internal prosecution policy to justify its decision.1II 
This deviation raised a suspicion about the prosecutor's motive 
which the court found sufficient to reverse the defendant's 
ment is not allowed, the defendant violates the law with complete immunity on an un· 
certain basis. Id. 
54. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972). 
55. Id. at 1152. 
56.Id. 
57. Defendant showed that there were ten violators of the census law. Six were non· 
protestors who were not prosecuted. Four, including the defendant, were vocal resistors 
and were prosecuted. Id. 
58. See United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant must 
show that others similarly situated generally have not been prosecuted for similar con· 
duct), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976). Accord, United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 
1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975). 
59. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (Cummings, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 625. 
61. Id. at 627. 
62. Id. at 621. The majority quoted at length from a memorandum issued by the 
Selective Service Director stating guidelines used to initiate prOceedings against draft 
avoiders. They also noted that the Selective Service violated those guidelines when it 
prosecuted Falk. Id. 
8
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conviction.68 
The Falk court did not specify the type of statistical show-
ing necessary to establish a defense of selective prosecution. In 
addition, the court stated that even without the necessary show-
ing, the defense could be established if the deviation from 
prosecutorial policy suggested that the defendant was being per-
secuted for his beliefs rather than for his conduct." 
The defense of selective prosecution remains a murky area 
in the law, especially as to how the defense can be established 
and what effect it has on the ability to prosecute. 
C. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Wilson, the court faced two issues: (1) 
whether the court had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory ap-
peal based on the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment 
for improper selective prosecution and (2) whether defendants 
presented sufficient evidence of a selective prosecution to war-
rant pre-trial dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that an order 
denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on selective prosecu-
tion grounds was immediately appealable and that the defen-
dants failed to make the necessary showing to raise the 
defense.ell 
For appeals purposes, both the selective prosecution and the 
vindictive prosecution defenses are based on the same considera-
tions. As the Wilson court noted, both types of prosecutions are 
instigated punitively against a defendant in retaliation for the 
exercise of constitutional rights." Although the specific is-
sue-whether a selective prosecution claim was immediately ap-
pealable-was a case of first impression, the Wilson court relied 
so heavily on its previous decision in Griffin that the decision 
broke little legal ground.87 
63. ld. But cf. Spillman v. United States, 413 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.) (mere devia· 
tion from prosecutorial policy could not justify acquittal), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 
(1969). 
64. 479 F.2d at 624. 
65. 639 F.2d at 502, 504. 
66. ld. at 502. 
67. The Griffin decision actually set a precedent that certain challenges to an indict· 
ment would be immediately appealable. This decision was the first post-Abney claim 
that fit within the Cohen exception. The Wilson decision merely followed Griffin very 
9
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First, the Wilson court reasoned that a selective prosecution 
ruling was a final determination of that issue, similar to a vindic-
tive prosecution ruling.88 Second, the ruling was not a step to-
wards disposition on the merits as the ruling had nothing to do 
with whether the defendants filed false withholding forms. Fi-
nally, the claim of selective prosecution involved a right to be 
" 'free from prosecution itself, rather than merely the right to be 
free from a subsequent conviction.' "811 
The Wilson court declared the proper standard of review to 
be the clearly erroneous standard.'o A selective prosecution de-
fense is based on facts developed at the pretrial hearing. The 
court thought that the selective prosecution test lent itself to the 
clearly erroneous standard because it is a factual question71 and 
involved no novelty to the bench or bar. 
The court then unanimously held that the defendants had 
not made the necessary showing to establish a selective prosecu-
tion defense.71 The defendants' evidence showed that the IRS 
prosecuted fewer than one half of one percent of those similarly 
situated to the defendants." Defendants failed, however, to es-
tablish that others prosecuted were also protestors.'4 Conse-
quently, the court denied defendants' motion for dismissal." 
The court stated that had the defendants shown that only 
protestors were prosecuted, they would have been entitled to a 
dismissal of the indictment." Subsequently, the court stated 
that "unless one can show that the tax laws are deployed against 
protestors in retaliation for the exercise of their rights, a selec-
tive prosecution argument will fail"" and that "it is to be ex-
pected that a disproportionate number of tax protestors will be 
prosecuted" even though protestors make up a very small per-
closely but did not set a far reaching precedent. 
68. 639 F.2d at 502. See also text accompanying note 11 supra. 
69. 639 F.2d at 502 (quoting United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1345). 
70. 639 F.2d at 503. 
71. 19 LoY. L. REv. 318, 325 (1973) (once raised, the defense of discriminatory pros-
ecution presents a question of fact). 
72. 639 F.2d at 504. 
73. The IRS prosecuted two of 425 violators. [d. at 501. 
74. [d. at 504. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. at 505. 
10
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centage of all violators.7s This dictum suggests that the Ninth 
Circuit closely followed the Steele rationale that defendants 
must show perfect delineation between protestors and non-
protestors to sustain a defense of selective prosecution." 
The Wilson court rejected defendants' claim that any devia-
tion from prosecutorial policy established a defense of selective 
prosecution. Unlike Falk, the court claimed that any deviation 
must be motivated by animus against the defendants because 
they exercised their constitutional rights.so The result is that the 
court will not consider a deviation from prosecutorial policy sus-
picious unless defendants first make the necessary statistical 
showing. 
Judge Real, concurring in the result, disagreed with the ma-
jority on the appealability issue. He claimed that vindictive 
prosecution and selective prosecution are based on different con-
siderations. SI First, the concurrence argued that a vindictive 
prosecution claim involves " 'running the gauntlet' " twice before 
an appeal could be taken.SII The concurrence differentiated vin-
dictive and selective prosecution claims because a selective pros-
ecution claim is not collateral to the. merits but instead "requires 
a court to delve into empirical data not vaguely relevant to guilt 
or innocence in the very prosecution in which the claim is 
made."sa The concurrence felt that a vindictive prosecution 
claim is entirely collateral to the merits of the instant case" in 
that it involves retaliation against a defendant for exercising a 
constitutional right in an entirely different case.SS 
The concurrence's second argument was that as a matter' of 
policy the test for determining the validity of a vindictive prose-
cution claim is simpler than the test for a selective prosecution 
78. Id. The court stated that thousands of returns may bear further investigation, 
but protestor's returns provide the strongest cases where willfulne88 is a part of the cause 
of action. Id. 
79. See note 57 supra for the delineation between protestors and non-protestors in 
Steele. . 
SO. 639 F.2d at 505. 
81. 1d. (Real, J., concurring). 
82. Id. (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 662). 
83. 639 F.2d at 506. 
84.Id. 
85. Id. See cases cited in note 35 supra. 
11
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claim.8s The concurrence expressed concern that allowing a chal-
lenge to the prosecutor's discretion in selecting a particular de-
fendant was tantamount to sanctioning an appellate court's su-
pervision over the prosecutor's office.87 
D. ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Wilson, the Ninth Circuit liberalized 
the opportunity to take an appeal from an interlocutory order 
denying a motion to dismiss an indictment. This opportunity 
will probably be extended to encompass all constitutional chal-
lenges to an indictment. 
Wilson is part of an unhealthy trend which, if true to pre-
diction, may flood the appellate courts with interlocutory ap-
peals used primarily to delay trial." The Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach in Griffin and Wilson struck the balance too heavily in 
favor of the defendant with very little justification. The need for 
efficiency in criminal proceedings is especially acute·- and 
should not be disregarded without a compelling reason. 
The specific problem with Griffin and Wilson is that the de-
cisions misconstrued the Cohen test" as applied in Abney.-l The 
Griffin court stated that the defendant would suffer irreparable 
harm if put to the expense of a criminal trial because of a vin-
dictive prosecution. _I Enduring a trial and being convicted of a 
crime does not constitute irreparable harm even when the con-
86. See United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1346. The prosecution has a heavy bur-
den "to justify the increase in severity of the alleged charges whenever it has the oppor-
tunity to reindict the accused because the accused has exercised a procedural right." Id. 
(citing United States v. Rueaga-M&rtinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976». 
87. United States v. Wilaon, 639 F.2d at 506. 
88. Id. at 502. Interlocutory appeals frustrate the speedy trial policy and multiply 
the work of the court. The court processed 38 interlocutory appeals in a four-month 
period and noted that few had any merit. Id. United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 838 
(9th Cir. 1980) (interlocutory appeals have a disruptive effect on the trial courts). 
89. See cases cited in note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
90. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
91. The Supreme Court in Abney reasoned that a double jeopardy claim was appeal-
able by applying the Cohen test as follows: (1) the order was final because the defendant 
has exhausted all means of avoiding an allegedly unconstitutional trial; (2) the claim was 
collateral to the merits because it challenged the authority of the government to hail the 
defendant into court; and (3) the order threatened irreparable harm to defendant's con-
stitutional right because it could not be fully vindicated on appeal. Abney v. United 
States, 431 U.S. at 659-62. 
92. United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1346. 
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viction is reversed on constitutional grounds." If enduring an 
unnecessary trial constituted irreparable harm, then the collat-
eral order exception should apply to the denial of any pre-trial 
motion. If a defendant is convicted with illegally seized evidence, 
he is forcibly tried and has to undergo the "personal strain, pub-
lic embarrassment and expense'''' of preparing a defense. Practi-
cally speaking, a motion to suppress evidence would be immedi-
ately appealable. The ruling is final because the evidence will be 
introduced against the defendant; it is collateral to the main is-
sue before the court, whether the defendant is guilty as charged. 
Finally, the defendant will suft'er irreparable harm because he 
will have to endure a trial that will later prove unnecessary. The 
Supreme Court has rejected this argument. N 
Applying Griffin'S reasoning to its fullest theoretical limits 
would totally undermine the final judgment rule and exacerbate 
the dilatory strategies which impede judicial efficiency." Fur-
thermore, Griffin considered challenges to an indictment to be 
on a higher plane than other types of challenges." Such chal-
lenges should not have a preferred status." 
The better approach is to limit the Cohen test to a showing 
of irreparable harm, defined as damage to a statutory or consti-
tutional right inflicted upon a defendant which cannot be vindi-
cated on appeal. If the defendant shows irreparable harm, he 
should have an opportunity to appeal the decision of whether it 
93. See also Gilmore v. United States, 264 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 
U.S. 994 (1959): 
[Appellate Review must await the end of trial) even though, at 
the end of that trial, or an appeal from a judgment of convic-
tion, it is ultimately determined that the violation of the con-
stitutional right compels an acquittal. When that is the out-
come, the individual may claim in a very real sense to have 
been subjected to a trial that ought never to have taken place. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
94. United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1346. 
95. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962) (denial of motion to 
suppress illegal evidence is not immediately appealable). 
96. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1167. 
97. 617 F.2d at 1348. 
98. See Gilmore v. United States, 264 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.s. 
994 (1959). "At least so long as a criminal trial is pending, review of such matters, as for 
example, unlawful search and seizure, unlawful arrest, unlawful detention, unlawful in-
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is collateral to the main issue. The other two criteria provide an 
inadequate basis for analysis and appear not to make much of a 
difference." 
To alleviate the burden of interlocutory appeals, the Ninth 
Circuit should drop vindictive and selective prosecution claims 
from consideration for an immediate appeal because any harm 
done to a defendant can be corrected on appeal. For those or-
ders which remain immediately appealable, the court should en-
act a system of concurrent jurisdictionlOO so trial can progress 
while the appellate court reviews the defendant's claim. This 
system would protect the defendant's right to an immediate ap-
peal without as much potential for abuse as a strategy for delay. 
The difficulties inherent in establishing a selective prosecu-
tion claim are far more problematic. The problem with the Falk 
test is that it encourages public agencies to publish vague and 
general guidelines for prosecution or forego publishing them at 
all. Consequently, the prosecutor has much more unbridled dis-
cretion-an unhealthy sign in a free society.10l The Steele test is 
so stringently construed that it may have written itself out of 
existence.10I Even Yick Wo could not have met the stringent 
Steele standard because, although all Chinese persons were 
prosecuted, one non-Chinese person was also prosecuted. loa 
Another problem is defining the line between permissible 
and impermissible selection. If all but one of those prosecuted 
are protestors, the protestors cannot raise the defense of selec-
tive prosecution. If the law is enforced exclusively against 
99. See note 28 supra. 
100. See United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985, 988-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 447 
U.S. 926 (1980). The Fifth Circuit haa devised a lIystem to expedite interlocutory ap-
peals. First, the district court decides if the motion to dismiss ia frivolous. If it is, the 
trial continues while the defendant appeals the decision. The appellate court considers 
these appeals on an expedited basis and merely decides if the appeal haa merit. If it 
does, the trial is halted while the appellate court considers the issues raised in the ap-
peal.Id. 
101. See K. DAVIS, DISCRBTIONARY JuSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 225 (1969) 
(Prosecutors should be required to structure their discretion to make it less arbitrary.). 
102. It is very unusual when a defendant can show that no other violator who did 
not exercise his or her constitutional rights was prosecuted. The Wilson majority noted 
that the defendant in Steele was the only one in a Ninth Circuit case to successfully 
raise the defense of selective prosecution. United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d at 505. 
103. Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356. 359 (1886). 
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protestors, each protestor can raise the defense,I04 even if the 
prosecutor shows that the selection was based on limited re-
sources or other permissible criteria. Such a small quantitative 
change does not justify such a divergent result. The policies and 
considerations that allow a prosecutor to consciously select 
protestors for prosecution loa exist equally whether he prosecuted 
many, most, or all protestors. Conversely, this same discretion 
allows a prosecutor to refuse to prosecute non-protestors without 
endangering the prosecution of the protestors.loe 
Drawing inferences from statistics is a risky endeavor, espe-
cially in selective prosecution cases, because it is well understood 
that a high degree of selectivity is necessary to enable the prose-
cutor to perform his duties. 1M Deciding between permissible and 
impermissible selectivity cannot be done solely by statistical 
analysis. The solution as to how this constitutional interest will 
be protected is elusive. Courts seem willing to use statistics as 
the best approximation of a prosecutor's motive without a face-
to-face confrontation between the defendant and the prosecutor, 
reliance on pure speculation, or direct supervision of the prose-
cutor's office, all of which have tremendous problems. 
The showing necessary to raise the selective prosecution de-
104. The protestors may ultimately lose, but according to the holding in Wilson, 
they get the benefit of an immediate appeal. 
105. See United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 952 (1976). 
"The awareness by the I.R.S. of the fact that the defendant 
publicly explained in detail how he had frustrated the tax 
withholding laws and urged others to follow his example may 
well have influenced the I.R.S. in selecting him as a person 
whose prosecution would have relatively great deterrent value. 
Such selective prosecution is deemed reasonable and 
appropriate. It 
Id. (quoting the district court finding without citation). 
106. See United States v. Choate, 619 F.2d 21, 23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
951 (1980) (quoting United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511, 515 (N.D. m. 1954)): 
[C]itizens are entitled to equal protection of the law but these 
decisions do not hold that citizens are entitled to equal protec-
tion from the laws. The fact that not all criminals are prose-
cuted is no valid defense to the one prosecuted . . . . [T]he 
administration of such a matter lies in the discretion of the 
prosecuting attorney. 
Id. (emphasis in Manno). 
107. See United States v. Choate, 619 F.2d 21, 23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
951 (1980); United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d at 505. 
15
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fense should be relaxed to make it meaningful and yet protect 
the prosecutor's discretion from unwarranted intrusion. This 
conflict can be resolved without jettisoning either policy. The 
analytical problem that exists in all selective prosecution claims 
is that a primary question is left unanswered: Is the basis for 
this prosecution arbitrary? This threshold question must be an-
swered before the traditional equal protection analysis can be 
utilized coherently. In tax protest cases the answer is emphati- . 
cally no.IOe There are many good reasons for prosecuting protes-
tors: (1) there is a greater deterrence effect, (2) there is a better 
chance of conviction, (3) their violations are flagrant and willful, 
and (4) they encourage others in civil disobedience. 
If the threshold question of arbitrariness is answered in the 
negative, the analysis should cease. At this point it should not 
matter what statistical showing the defendant makes, even if he 
shows that only protestors are prosecuted. An allegation that a 
defendant is being prosecuted for protesting is meaningless in 
this context. The reply to the allegation is simply that, although 
a defendant is being prosecuted for protesting, there is a reason-
able basis for selectivity based on the re$Sons enumerated above. 
This should not be interpreted to mean that the exercise of 
constitutional rights should never be an impermissible classifica-
tion, but only that the exercise of constitutional rights is not al-
ways an arbitrary basis for a selection for prosecution. For ex-
ample, if the tax laws were selectively enforced against 
Communists, the standard would clearly be arbitrary and the 
defense of selective prosecution should be allowed. 
This prior determination of arbitrariness would obviate the 
necessity of such a difficult showing required to establish the de-
fense. Once it has been determined that the selection of a defen-
lOS. See United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir.) (an active tax protestor 
who draws attenion to himself may be specially proeecuted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 
(1979); United States v. Gardiner, 631 F.2d 953, 954 (9th Cir.) (it is not surprising to 
prosecute violations of the tax laws that are most flagrant), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 
(1976); accord, United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1975) (selection based 
on advocacy of civil disobedience is appropriate as it has (leat deterrent value), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976); United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 11~, 1195 (9th Cir.), cen. 
denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975). 
16
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dant is arbitrary, then all the defendant should be required to 
show is a general pattern of selective enforcement on this basis, 
not the total absence of other prosecutions.' The defendant 
would still have to meet the requirements of the equal protec-
tion analysis, but these requirements can be sensitized to detect 
when a pattern of arbitrary selection is taking place. 
The statistical showing needed to trigger an investigation 
into the defense is unknown. Perhaps the best formulation is if 
prosecution of the arbitrarily selected group far exceeds their 
representation in the pool of all violators. The prosecution 
would then be given an opportunity to rebut the charge by 
showing that the defendant's conduct was more flagrant than 
others or that they were randomly selected. 
Finally, this test would better serve both policies than the 
current test. Once the prosecutor established that the basis for 
selection was permissible, there would be' no hearing because 
statistics would be irrelevant. Thus, the prosecutor's discretion 
would be amply protected without burdensome judicial supervi-
sion. On the other hand, the defendant would have the benefit of 
an easier burden of proof once he establishes that his selection 
was arbitrary. 
There is a tremendous need for judicial legislation in this 
area. Both of these conflicting policies must be accommodated 
by a single test because they both serve important societal inter-
ests. The rights of a defendant to non-arbitrary law enforcement 
need not be sacrificed on the altar of prosecutorial discretion. 
Jeff Kirk 
II. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION 
In other cases last term, the Ninth Circuit upheld IRS sum-
monses for business records of the Swiss subsidiaries of Ameri-
can firms even though compliance may expose the subsidiaries 
to criminal liability in Switzerland, permitted the surviving cor-
poration in a triangular reorganization to carry back its post-
merger losses without special limitations; and addressed the 
novel issue of the proper tax treatment of rights acquired by a 
professional sports team. 
17
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A. ENFORCING INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE SUMMONS 
In United States u. Vetco, Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit held that 
the Swiss-United States Tax Treaty does not preclude the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (the IRS) from using summonses to obtain 
business records of the Swiss subsidiaries of American firms de-
spite possible criminal liability in Switzerland for such compli-
ance. Applying a balancing approach, the court further deter-
mined that any contrary Swiss interest is outweighed by a strong 
American interest in collecting taxes from and prosecuting tax 
fraud by its own nationals operating through foreign 
subsidiaries.-
Vetco is an American-based corporation which manufac-
tures offshore drilling equipment. Vetco International, A.G. 
(VIAG) is Vetco's wholly-owned Swiss subsidiary. Vetco is sub-
ject to subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) for 
the reporting of VIAG's income.s 
The IRS asserted that, by using a Swiss corporation as a 
middleman to ship its products indirectly to VIAG for sale, 
Vetco attempted to avoid subpart F income since VIAG's in-
come no longer was derived from transactions with a related cor-
poration outside Switzerland.· 
When Vetco failed to voluntarily disclose relevant records, 
the IRS issued summonses to Vetco, Vetco's accountants (DH & 
S) and its attorneys. Vetco ordered its attorneys and account-
ants not to comply.s 
The district court determined that the summonses had been 
issued for proper purposes and, after a special hearing oli the 
effect of Swiss law, ordered Vetco and DH & S to produce their 
1. 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Skopil, J. the other panel members were Nel-
son, J. and East, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 
8, 1981). 
2. Id. at 1333. 
3. See I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (CCH 1979). Subpart F of the Code requires that income of 
a controlled foreign corporation be reported on the Federal Income Tax return of the 
parent corporation if ten percent of the subsidiary's income resulted from transactions 
with related corporations located outside the country of the subsidiary's incorporation. 
I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(a) (amended 1975). 
4. 644 F.2d at 1326. 
5. Id. at 1327. 
18
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Swiss records.· However, the court failed to enter findings of fact 
or conclusions of law with respect to the summonses.' Vetco and 
DH & S subsequently appealed the order and contempt sanc-
tions imposed for noncompliance.· 
On appeal,- the appellants argued that compliance with the 
6. Id. The district court held that Vetco's attorneys were not required to produce 
DH " S's tax survey. 
7.ld. 
8.ld. 
9. Three other issues were raised on appeal. First, appellants argued that the dis-
trict court erred in failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. With respect 
to this issue, the court noted that "[elven if Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires findings and conclusions in summons enforcement and contempt pro-
ceedings, the district court could have modified that requirement by issuing an order" 
pursuant to FBD. R. CIY. P. 82(a)(3). 644 F.2d at 1327. Consequently, the court summa-
rily concluded that there was no rational reason for the district court to carry out such a 
formality. Id. See Brunswick Corp. v. Doft', 638 F.2d 108, 110-11 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Vetco also argued that the SwiBB-United States Tax Treaty precluded the use of IRS 
summonses to obtain busineBB records held in Switzerland and that IRS regulations pro-
vide that treaty information-exchange provisions are the sole means of obtaining such 
records. 644 F.2d at 1328. 
Article XVI of the Treaty provides in relevant part: 
(1) The competent authorities of the contracting States 
shall exchange such information (bei", information available 
under the re.pective taxation law. of the contracti", State.) 
as is neceaaary for carrying out the provisions of the present 
Convention or for the prevention of fraud or the like in rela-
tion to the taxes which are the subject of the present Conven-
tion •... No information .hall be exchanged which would 
disclo,e any trade. bwine". indwtrial or profes.ional ,ecret 
or any trade proceB8. 
(3) In no case shall the provisions of this Article be con-
strued so as to impose on either of the contracting States the 
obligation to carry out administrative measures at variance 
with the regulations and practice. of either contracting State 
or which would be contrary to its sovereignty. security or 
public policy or to supply particulars which are not 
procurable under its own legislation or that of the State ask-
ing application. 
Convention on Double Taxation of Income, Sept. 27. 1951, United States-Switzerland. 2 
U.S.T. 1751. 1760-61. T.I.A.S. No. 2316 (emphasis added). The court determined that 
none of these provisions precluded the IRS from issuing summonses to gather informa-
tion. 644 F.2d at 1328. 
Vetco also argued that IRS regulations which provide for treaty information-ex-
change provisions are the exclusive means of obtaining such records. Vetco based its 
contention on , 42(10)(10).1(4) of the Internal Revenue Manual which provides in perti-
nent part that "[tlhe Articles of the respective tax conventions determine the extent of 
the information obtainable in Treaty countries." II AUDIT, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 
(CCH) , 42(10)(10).1(4). However. such provisions are "not the exclusive means of ob-
19
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IRS summonses would result in violation of Article 273 of the 
Swiss Penal Code which makes unlawful the disclosure of manu-
facturing or business secrets to a foreign government!O Appel-
lants relied primarily on Societe Internationale v. Rogers,.l in 
which the Supreme Court stated that "fear of criminal prosecu-
tion constitutes a weighty excuse for non-production, and this 
excuse is not weakened because the law preventing compliance 
are those of a foreign sovereign. "11 
In Societe Internationale, a Swiss company sued for recov-
ery of property seized by the United States government pursu-
ant to the Trading with the Enemy Act. The Swiss government 
enjoined the plaintiff who was accused of conspiring with a 
Swiss banking firm from obtaining the Swiss banks' business 
records. I I 
The Vetco panel noted that Societe Internationale "did not 
erect an absolute bar to summons enforcement and contempt 
sanctions whenever compliance is prohibited by foreign law,"l. 
and that Societe Internationale specified that its ruling did not 
apply "to every situation where a party is restricted by law from 
producing documents over which it is otherwise shown to have 
taining information where the treaty does not so provide and where the foreign source is 
a subsidiary of an American corporation." 644 F.2d at 1329. Thus, the court found the 
issuance of summonses not in violation of either the Swiss-United States Tu Treaty or 
IRS regulations regarding information-exchange provisions. 
Regarding the third issue addressed on appeal, DH & S contended that it was de-
nied due proceas since the district court's production order sought "all" records de-
scribed in the summons and the order to show cause had only specified those documents 
held in Switzerland. On this issue, the court noted that the district court's order encom-
passed only those documents located in Switzerland. Thus, DH & S was not denied due 
proceas. Id. at 1333. 
10. Whoever makes available a manufacturing or business se-
cret to a foreign governmental agency or a foreign corporation 
or private enterprise or to an agent of any of them, shall be 
subject to imprisonment and in grave cases to imprisonment 
in a penitentiary. 
The imprisonment may be combined with a fine. 
StGB art. 273. See Swiss Federal Attorney v. A., 98 BGE IV 209 (1972) (UBusineas se-
cret" includes "all facts of business life to the extent that there are interests worthy of 
protection in keeping them confidential."). 
11. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
12. Id. at 211. 
13. rd. at 201. 
14. 644 F.2d at 1329. 
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control."l!! Rather, the determination depends on "the circum-
stances of a given case. "1' 
The court, in ruling that the instant action was not COD-
trolled by the holding in Societe Internationale, diStinguished 
the latter case on several grounds. First, the plaintiff in Societe 
Internationale made extensive good faith efforts to comply with 
the discovery request, whereas Vetco made no such effort.1'J Sec-
ond, in Societe Internationale, it was the Swiss government not 
a private corporation that sought to enjoin the plaintiff from 
complying with the summons'" Third, the Court in Societe In-
ternationale determined that production would violate Swiss 
law,l' whereas in Vetco there was no comparable finding.lo 
Fourth, the document requested in Societe Internationale was a 
civil discovery order rather than an IRS summons issued pursu-
ant to an investigation leading to potential criminal conduct. II 
After distinguishing Societe Internationale, the court bal-
anced the competing interests as required by In re Westing-
house Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation,U to deter-
mine whether foreign illegality ought to preclude enforcement of 
the IRS summonses. I. 
15. 357 U.S. at 205·06. 
16. ld. at 206. 
17. ld. at 201. 
18. ld. at 200. 
19. ld. at 204. 
20. 644 F.2d at 1330. 
We have spent I don't know how many months now going 
into the question of Swiss law, and this threat of penal sane· 
tions. Based on what I have before me at this point, I am now 
of the view that the threat of criminal sanctions by Switzer· 
land is not as real as was initially suggested to me to be. 
ld. n.7. (quoting district court hearing of Nov. 15, 1979). 
21. ld. at 1330. According to the Vetco court, such IRS summonses "serve a more 
preBBing national function than civil discovery." ld. 
22. 563 F.2d 992, 997 (lOth Cir. 1977). 
23. Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce 
rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsis· 
tent conduct upon the part of a penon, each state is required 
by intemationallaw to consider, in good faith, moderating the 
exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such 
factors as 
(a) vital national interests of each of the states, 
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that 
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After a careful analysis of these balancing factors, the court 
concluded that the United States had a compelling interest in 
obtaining the documents to collect taxes and prosecute tax fraud 
by its own nationals operating through foreign subsidiaries, 
while Switzerland had a small interest in insisting that the docu-
ments not be produced. If Furthermore, the court was uncon-
vinced that production of the documents in question would im-
pose a significant hardship on appellants. III The court reasoned 
that had Vetco kept a copy of such records as required by Code 
section 964,16 the instant controversy would never have arisen. 
Moreover, appellants failed to cite a single case concerning pros-
ecution for compliance with a court order enforcing an IRS 
summons.I '/' 
B. CARRYBACK OF POST-MERGER LOSSES IN TRIANGULAR 
ORGANIZATION 
In Bercy Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,l8 a case of first 
impression, the court addressed the issue of whether a subsidi-
ary corporation involved in a triangular merger can carry back 
its post-merger losses to offset pre-merger income of the trans-
feror corporation, where the subsidiary was a mere shell before 
the merger.le Reversing the tax court, the Ninth Circuit held 
that New Bercy, the surviving corporation, could under section 
381(b)(3) of the Code carry back its post-reorganization losses 
without special liinitations. 
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to 
take place in the territory of the other state, 
(d) the nationality of the person, and 
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of 
either state can reasonably be expected to achieve com-
pliance with the rule prescribed by that state. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965). 
24. "Switzerland's only interest is in protecting the privacy of its non-consenting 
domiciliaries. This interest is further diminished where the party seeking the records is 
the IRS, which is required by law to keep information confidential." 644 F.2d at 1331. 
25. rd. at 1331-32. 
26. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 964(c)(CCH 1979), an American corporation is required to 
keep records respecting its controlled foreign corporation sufficient to determine whether 
subpart F tax is due. 644 F.2d at 1332. 
27. 644 F.2d at 1332. 
28. 640 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Trask, J.; the other panel members were Nel-
son and Solomon, J.J.). 
29. rd. at 1059. 
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In 1965, Bercy Industries incorporated. Three years later, 
Beverly Enterprises established Beverly Manor as its subsidiary 
shell corporation. In 1970, Bercy Industries (Old Bercy) was ac-
quired by Beverly Manor through a triangular merger. 10 Beverly 
Manor then changed its name to Bercy Industries (New Bercy). 
The shareholders of Old Bercy exchanged their stock for shares 
of the parent corporation, Beverly Enterprises. The stock in Old 
Bercy was then cancelled.81 New Bercy was expected to profit as 
did Old Bercy, but instead suffered a loss. In reliance on the 
carry-back provision of Code section 172,11 New Bercy at-
tempted to offset this loss against the net operation income of 
Old Bercy. The tax court disallowed the loss carryback and New 
Bercy appealed. 
The Commissioner argued that Code section 381(b)(3) re-
flects a policy of not permitting loss carryback when the legal 
and economic identity of the corporation has been substantially 
altered.18 The Commissioner further argued that because Con-
gress specifically identified two circumstances in which loss car-
rybacks would be permitted under section 381(b)(3),14 the Com-
missioner argued that "if Congress had also intended to permit 
carrybacks in a triangular merger involving a shell corporation, 
it would have specifically mentioned this circumstance as 
well."N 
Mter a careful examination of legislative history and statu-
30. "This is a transaction in which a subsidiary corporation acquirea another corpo-
ration by using the stock of the subaidiary's parents as conaideration for the acquisition." 
Id. n.2. . 
31. Id. at 1059. 
32. A corporation which incurs a net operating 1088 may carry this 1088 back three 
tax years, or forward seven tax years, to offset net operating income earned during those 
years. I.R.C. § 172. 
33. 640 F.2d at 1060. 
34. In two important areas . . . the problem of allocating the 
1088 is not involved, and it is suggested in such cases, at least, 
there should be no limit on carrybacks. One is the case of 
reincorporation of the same corporation in 8 different state, or 
upon the expiration of its charter. Another inatance is that of 
the wholly-owned subsidiary which is liquidated into its par-
ent, which parent suffers a net operating 1088 in the following 
year. 
Hearings on H.R. 8300, Before the Senate Finance Comm., 83d Cong., 2d Seas. 404, 404 
(1954). 
35. 640 F.2d at 1061. 
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tory structure, the panel decided that Congress had been "preoc-
cupied with post-reorganization allocation problems when it en-
acted the loss carryback restriction. "86 The court also reasoned 
that when section 381(b)(3) was enacted in 1954, "the Code did 
not permit a corporation to use its parent's stock as considera-
tion for the acquisition of another corporation's assets in a tax-
free reorganization. "87 Thus, the use of shells in effecting corpo-
rate reorganizations was not yet recognized. However, the use of 
parent stock as consideration for a corporate acquisition was 
sanctioned by amendments in 1968 and 1971." 
The Court agreed with the Second Circuit which stated in 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States,"* that Congress 
intended to prohibit post-reorganization carryback losses "only 
when such a carryback would entail complex problems of post-
reorganization allocation."40 Even assuming the Commissioner 
had correctly stated the congressional policy regarding subsec-
tion (b)(3), the court was unconvinced "that a material change 
in identity resulted from the reorganization here at issue. The 
reorganization involved only one set of operating assets, one set 
of books, and one tax history."41 Because New Bercy operated 
the same commercial business as did Old Bercy, "[t]he indispu-
table fact is that the same business generated both the income 
and the loss."" Thus, the court held that New Bercy could util-
ize the loss carryback provision of section 381(b)(3), even though 
the subsidiary corporation was a mere shell before the merger, 
since no material change resulted in Old Berey's identity.u 
36. With respect to the enactment of subsection (b)(3) of sec-
tion 381, the legislative history shows that Congre88 was con-
cerned with a com pies accounting problem-deciding how a 
post-reorganization loss should be allocated between the ac-
quiring corporation and the transferor corporations, and, 
therefore, how much of the 1088 should be carried back to oft'-
set each entity's income in the preceeding three tu years. 
rd. at 1060-61. 
37. rd. at 1061. 
38. Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-621, § 1(a), S2 Stat. 1310-11 (triangular 
mergers); Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-693, § 1(a), 84 Stat. 2077 (reverse triangu-
lar mergers). 
39. 568 F.2d 811, 819, 822, 824 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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C. THE TREATMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS 
In First Northwest Industries of America v. Commis-
sioner,·· the Ninth Circuit addressed a novel issue regarding the 
proper tax treatment of a professional sports team, the Seattle 
Supersonics. In 1970, the National Basketball Association (the 
NBA) expanded the league by selling three newly-created ex-
pansion teams.411 The taxpayer owned the Seattle Supersonics 
and received an equal share of the expansion proceeds along 
with thirteen other NBA owners. At issue was the proper tax 
treatment of those expansion proceeds. 
The taxpayer acquired association rights·' when he pur-
44. 649 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members were An-
derson, J. and Taylor, D.J., sitting by designation). 
45. The NBA expanded in 1970 by selling new teams in Portland, Buffalo, and 
Cleveland. Id. at 708. 
46. The association rights acquired are as follows: 
1. The right to participate in a special expansion draft in 
which it could select 15 veteran players from ten existing 
teams; 
2. The right to participate in the 1967 college draft; 
3. The right to participate in all post-I967 annual NBA 
college drafts; 
4. The right to participate in NBA basketball by compet-
ing against other teams, including the right to retain all home-
game receipts; 
5. The exclusive right to exhibit NBA basketball within a 
75-mile radius of Seattle; 
6. The right to an equal share (with other team owners) of 
all revenues derived from national broadcasting of NBA 
games; 
7. The exclusive rights for local broadcasting of Sonics' 
games; 
8. The right to an equal share of revenues derived from 
NBA promotional and merchandising activities; 
9. The right to an equal share of revenues derived from 
NBA playoff and all-star games; 
10. The right to enjoy the benefits of NBA reputation and 
goodwill; 
11. The rights (and obligations) of participating in a sys-
tem which establishes within the NBA of priority rights to 
players and the bargaining rights of each team with respect to 
its own players; 
12. The right to share equally with proceeds from future 
NBA expansions; 
13. Other rights, benefits, and obligations attendant to be-
ing a member of the NBA. 
Id. at 707-08. 
Not at issue was the tax court's treatment of taxpayer's rights to share in the 1968 
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chased the Supersonics in 1967. The tax court labelled the other 
rights acquired in the purchase "basic nonterminable rights" 
possessed by all NBA team owners.47 The tax court noted that a 
proportion of the nonterminable rights were transferred to the 
expansion teams48 and allowed the taxpayer to subtract from his 
portion of the amount realized an equivalent proportion of his 
cost in acquiring these rights. 
On appeal, the Commissioner argued that the rights trans-
ferred were not original, but were new rights "created" by the 
existing teams.4' As such, the Commissioner asserted the tax-
payer was precluded from subtracting the proportionate cost of 
these rights from his amount realized in computing capital 
gains.GO 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that "some, but not 
all, of the rights acquired by taxpayer in 1967 were partially 
transferred to the new owners. "Gl The court agreed with the 
Commissioner that taxpayer's "franchise" rights-the right to 
participate in the NBA, the exclusive right to local broadcasting, 
and its exclusive right to exhibit NBA basketball within a sev-
enty-five-mile radius of Seattle-were not transferred. at There-
fore, the taxpayer's cost in acquiring these nontransferrable 
rights were improperly included by the tax court in calculating 
the taxpayer's basis. 
With respect to the taxpayer's remaining "nonterminable" 
rights, the court concluded these were existing rather than 
expansion proceeds and the right to participate in the expan8ion draft. The tax court 
had properly determined that these rights had a limited useful life which the taxpayer 
was entitled to amortize. 649 F.2d at 708. For an analysis of this aspect of the decision, 
see Note, Federal Income Tax-Amortization and the Expansion Sports Franchise, 54 
WASH. L. REV. 827 (1979). 
47. 649 F.2d at 708. 
48. "The tax court reasoned that, because there were 14 owners prior to the 1970 
expansion, taxpayer had a 1/14 interest in these rights. After expansion, it had a 1/17 
interest. Hence, a proportion of its original interest had been transferred to the expan· 
sion teams." Id. 
49. "'(T]he rights obtained by the new teams were not siphoned off from the ex· 
isting teams but rather were entirely new rights created when the league approved the 
expansion plan and granted the franchises.''' Id. (quoting Appellant's Opening Brief at 
10). 
50. 649 F.2d at 708·09. 
51. Id. at 709. 
52. Id. at 709·10. 
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newly-created rights and were proportionally transferred to the 
expansion teams. However, since the tax court had failed to de-
termine the cost of these rights, the First Northwest panel re-
manded the case. The critical question on remand, as framed by 
the court, is whether there is sufficient evidence to allocate the 
cost of these rights between those which were transferred and 
those retained by the taxpayer.1IS 
53. [d. at 710. 
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